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                                                      ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines a significant accounting innovation in central government 
accounting – the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) in the UK. 
This innovation is studied through the lens of Rogers diffusion theory. The study setting 
is the Scottish Parliament. This research shows that, in terms of diffusion theory, RAB 
can be classified as an accounting innovation. However, the implementation of RAB is 
problematic. While the reform of the UK central government system was initially sought 
as a mechanism to enhance democratic accountability, this paper shows that RAB does 
not connect with parliamentarians. The introduction of RAB flows as much from a 
managerial agenda as it does from the aim of democratic accountability. 
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                                                  REFORMING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT:  AN EVALUATION  
                                                  OF AN ACCOUNTING INNOVATION  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the adoption of Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
(RAB), which has at its heart a concentration on accrual accounting principles, as an 
innovation in central government accounting. This study focuses on UK policies and 
experiences. From 1866 to 2001, the UK central government had a cash system of 
accounting and budgeting. From 2001, the UK adopted a radical change to its central 
government accounting with the adoption of RAB; RAB entailing both accrual accounting 
and accrual budgeting, and aligning these to performance information where possible (HMT, 
1994). This study seeks to extend our knowledge of the impact of the important innovation 
of RAB. 
 
The move to RAB is often argued in terms of better accounting and improved management 
information for planning and control (Likierman, 2000). In the UK, HM Treasury’s view is 
that such information will provide politicians, as well as managers within the public sector, 
with more appropriate information on how resources meet objectives as a basis for 
enhancing democratic accountability as well as providing better value for money for 
taxpayers. As a result, it is envisaged that within government a more strategic approach to 
planning public expenditure would emerge, with better information in resource allocation 
and on consumption and investment (HM Treasury, 2001). 
 
In particular, this paper offers new insights into the use of government accounting (RAB) 
in the parliamentary context.  The research results presented in this paper examine RAB 
in central government as part of the modernisation of UK governments by the New 
Labour administrations of 1997, 2001 and 2005.  The specific context in which this 
accounting innovation is studied is the Scottish Parliament, which was established in 
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1999 as the UK central government sought to devolve its powers as part of its 
modernisation agenda. The Scottish Parliament is provided planning and financial 
reporting information using RAB, as HM Treasury deems the Scottish Government to be 
part of UK central government. 
 
This paper addresses the research question of whether RAB enhances or not the activities 
of parliamentarians in their exercise of democratic accountability by examining the 
introduction of RAB in the UK through the lens of diffusion theory (Rogers, 1995; 2003). 
While there has been some research on accounting in government, there is no conclusive 
prior research in the literature on the impact of RAB on the activities of elected members 
of UK parliaments.  Currently, the strongest available research evidence is from an earlier 
era (Likierman and Vass, 1984; Likierman and Creasey, 1985) and this highlights the 
limited expertise of parliamentarians in the scrutiny of financial information. However, 
this paper identifies more complex patterns of interaction between those in parliament 
and the use of governmental accounting.  This research also extends our understanding of 
the diffusion of innovations, specifically in public sector settings, where the introduction 
of innovations has distinctive traits. 
 
This paper is organised in a further four sections. First, this paper discusses the 
theoretical framework of the diffusion of innovations. Second, the research design sets 
out the study setting (the Scottish Parliament, which is obliged to use central government 
accounting practices by HM Treasury), sources of data and approach to data analysis. 
The results use Rogers diffusion model (Rogers, 2003) to examine the antecedents of this 
accounting innovation; the spreading of knowledge of central government accrual 
accounting; the manner in which the government sought to `persuade` potential users of 
the merits of this innovation; the decision to adopt RAB; and the implementation RAB 
through the lens of the views of key actors in and around the parliament on this 
accounting innovation. Finally, we finish with discussion and our conclusion. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DIFFUSION 
 
Diffusion theory has been used widely in accounting studies (see, for example, 
Malmi,1999; Bjornenak and Olson,1999), but predominantly in private sector settings. 
However, this perspective has been advocated as relevant and appropriate for the study of 
accounting innovations in public sector settings (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and 
Wright, 2004). Diffusion of innovations is said to occur at the point of adoption of an 
innovation (Rogers, 1983; 1995; 2003).  
 
The trajectory from innovation to diffusion is not automatic.  There are significant 
environmental factors which may promote or inhibit the diffusion process.  This is 
conventionally described as a five stage model which starts with the knowledge of the 
innovation (Rogers, 2003, p.170). However, it is evident from a close reading of the work 
by Rogers that the first stage is actually `prior conditions` which may determine the 
receptivity of any particular context to an innovation (Rogers,2003, pp169-170).  At 
p.169, Rogers (2003) reflects on the diffusion process as one which occurs over time and 
consists of a series of different actions. On p.170, Rogers(2003) identifies the prior 
conditions which impact on the diffusion of innovations. Specifically Rogers` prior 
conditions are these:  previous practice; felt needs or problems; innovativeness and norms 
in the social system. The second stage of Rogers Diffusion model centres on knowledge 
of the innovation in the decision making unit.(Rogers,2003,p37; p.170-173).The third 
stage of the  diffusion model is persuasion. Rogers (2003, p.170, p.222) observed that the 
following factors impinge on the likelihood of being persuaded to accept a diffusion: the 
complexity of the innovation; the possibility of a pilot or trial test of the innovation; the 
goodness of fit of the innovation with the adopter’s existing values; the perceived 
benefits to be derived from innovation; and the possibility of actually observing the 
results of the innovation (Rogers, 1995).These three stages of the diffusion model lead to 
Stage 4 – the decision. Rogers (2003, pp177-179) envisages that this may lead to a 
number of outcomes other than the straightforward decision to adopt the innovation. For 
example, the decision to accept may be subject to continuing approval, or immediate 
rejection may lead to later adoption or even continued rejection. Once the decision to 
adopt the innovation has been reached, the adopting organisation can proceed to Stage 5 - 
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implementation. However, implementation is an uncertain exercise and may prove 
complex and problematic (Rogers, 2003, pp179-188), in which opposition from groups 
who were not `innovators` may surface, and other actors in and around the scene of the 
adoption of the innovation may seek to alter, modify or `reinvent` the innovation. Finally, 
the Rogers (2003, pp189-194) has Stage 6 – confirmation. At this final stage, the 
adopters start to recognise the benefits of the innovation, may promote the innovation and 
are content with the innovation, such that it may be regarded as `routine`.   This diffusion 
model is shown in Table 1 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Rogers’ Model of The Innovation Diffusion Process 
Prior 
Conditions 
Knowledge Persuasion 
-Perceived 
characteristics of 
the Innovation 
Decision Implementation Confirmation 
1.Previous 
practice 
1.Recall of 
information 
1.Relative 
Advantage 
1.Adopt 1.Acquisition of 
information 
about the 
innovation 
1.Recognition 
of the benefits 
of using the 
innovation 
2.Felt needs 
or problems 
2.Comprehension 
of messages 
2.Compatibility 2. 
Continued 
adoption 
2.Use of the 
innovation on a 
regular basis 
2.Integration 
of the 
innovation 
into routines 
3.Inventiven
ess 
3.Knowledge and 
skill for effective 
adoption 
3.Complexity 3. Reject 3.Continued use 
of the innovation 
3.Promotion 
of the 
innovation 
4. Norms of 
the social 
system 
 4.Trialability 4. Later 
Adoption 
  
  5.Observability 5. 
Continued 
rejection 
  
Source: Adapted from E. Rogers The Diffusion of Innovations. 5
th
 Edition 2003 
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The diffusion of innovations is a process, rather than an act (Lapsley and Wright, 2004). 
Boundary spanning activity may be necessary by actors to bring inventions to the point of 
diffusion.  This process may be shaped by internal and external, formal and informal, 
channels of communication (Swan and Newell, 1995; Clegg, et al, 1996) and can take 
different forms.  There may be demand led diffusion of innovation by adopters, but it is 
also possible that suppliers will be promoting their particular innovation, regardless of 
perceived need by managers (Bjornenak, 1997). Within this process, interaction within 
networks or between suppliers and adopters may change or lead to further development 
of innovations (Bjornenak and Olsson, 1999; Geroski, 2000). 
 
While the work of Rogers (1983; 1995; 2003) is widely regarded as seminal, his work 
and later adaptations (Johannessen et al, 2001) have been criticised on a number of 
counts. These models of diffusion processes have been criticised as being `pro- 
individual`, as opposed to being organisational or societal in approach (Abrahamson, 
1991; Greenhalgh et al, 2005).  It has also been suggested that models of diffusion often 
exhibit a `pro-innovation` bias (Abrahamson, 1991; Greenhalgh et al, 2005). Other critics 
have suggested that these early models of diffusion need to be modified and extended for 
use in contemporary society (Chua, 1995; Briers and Chua, 2002). In particular, these 
critics are dismissive of the presumption that innovations are considered transferable to 
new contexts and settings, and often stress the need to examine the wider influences, 
social and technical, in examining diffusion (Chua, 1995; Briers and Chua, 2002).  This 
critique is summed up by Greenhalgh et al (2005, p.48) : 
  “... (early models) took little account of the wider context (historical, 
political, ideological, organisational) in which adoption decisions were 
made or of the unintended consequences of innovation”. 
 
These wider perspectives are taken into account in our examination of the nature of the 
innovation in UK accrual accounting system for central government. 
 
One particular facet of diffusion theory which is pertinent to the present study is the idea 
of compulsion. The early writers on diffusion presume that there is an individual who 
acts rationally and exercises a conscious, free choice whether to adopt an innovation or 
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not. However, a stream within the diffusion literature has detected the potentially 
significant impact of compulsion in the adoption of innovations. The idea of externally 
induced innovation was advanced by Van de Ven (1986), who considered such induced 
innovations as potential valuable to successful organisations. However, he argued that 
induced innovation in poorly performing organisations may simply perpetuate poor 
performance. Another take on this is Abrahamson`s (1991) idea of forced selection of 
innovations. This is the situation where the supplier can exert influence over all interested 
parties. These ideas resonate with the situation in the public sector where government 
perceptions of what constitutes the optimal policy choice may lead to induced adoption of 
accounting innovations in public organisations (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and 
Wright, 2004). These observations on compulsion are particularly pertinent to the 
selection of the specific accounting innovation under study in this paper – HM Treasury`s 
selection, adoption and promulgation of an accrual accounting system for central 
government which has been enforced on all parts of central government, including the 
Scottish Government. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
(a)The Study Setting: The Scottish Parliament 
 
The Scottish Parliament was established as a key plank of the incoming 1997 New 
Labour administration programme.  It sought to address the issue of the so-called 
“democratic deficit”, in which the majority of the Scottish electorate voted consistently 
against the majority political party at Westminster. 
 
The existence of the Scottish Parliament is itself a manifestation of the ‘New Labour’ 
administrations’ (of 1997, 2001 and 2005) focus on modernisation, which placed 
devolution as a priority in the overhaul of government machinery and accountability.  
The concept of devolution was that the government held reserve powers for policies to be 
handled centrally (foreign policy, defence, economics policy), with delegated powers 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament for key services (health, education, social services).  
Before the first devolved Scottish Parliament was elected in 1999, there was a distinctive 
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Scottish political machinery with a Secretary of State for Scotland and his ministerial 
team.  They were appointed by the UK Prime Minister to take forward the ruling 
government's policies from Westminster, with civil servants (the Scottish Office) to 
oversee the implementation of these policy agendas.  However, the pre-1999 
arrangements did not meet the UK government's expectations of 'modernisation', there 
being a lack of political accountability with few Scottish pieces of legislation being 
debated at Westminster. Moreover, there were suspicions that civil servants at the 
Scottish Office had too much influence and limited public scrutiny of the policies and 
actions of the Secretary of State for Scotland and his team (Bogdanor, 2001).  
 
However, the manner in which the Scottish Parliament has been substantiated also 
exhibits the hallmarks of the modernisation agenda.  The consultancy and steering group, 
which articulated what the Scottish Parliament was to become, established key principles: 
power sharing (the people, the legislators, the executive); accessible, open, responsive 
practices with participative procedures; accountability to the people in Scotland, with an 
equal opportunities perspective (Scottish Office, 1998a).  These key principles resonated 
with the New Labour Government's ideas of modernisation, particularly the emphasis on 
transparency, accountability and the responsiveness of the process of government to the 
needs of citizens and users of public services.  The manner in which these founding 
principles have been enacted creates, prima facie, a Parliament, which we categorise as 
deliberate – with potentially interesting implications for the use of accounting 
information, as elaborated upon further below. 
 
As part of the process of preparing for devolution, the then Secretary of State for 
Scotland initiated a series of consultation working parties.  One of these groups was the 
Financial Issues Advisory Group (FIAG) which was given the remit to report on how best 
the new Scottish Parliament could exercise budgetary control.  The FIAG observed that it 
would not be appropriate for the Scottish Parliament to merely adopt the existing 
practices of budgetary scrutiny of the UK Parliament at Westminster for the following 
reasons (Scottish Office, 1998b, p.28): 
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 there is a very limited time available for discussion of budget proposals on the 
floor of the House; 
 the motions available do not allow the House of Commons to influence the 
budget proposals; 
 the range of documents in which financial information is presented and the way 
in which such documents are considered by Parliament is less than satisfactory; 
and 
 many MPs lack the time and the technical expertise required to understand the 
budget documents. 
 
The FIAG recommended that the overwhelming aim of the budgetary system of the new 
Scottish Parliament was that of transparency: the management of finances in a way that 
is open, accessible and accountable to the people of Scotland (Scottish Office, 1998b, 
p.3). 
 
The specific mechanism for the scrutiny of the budget, which was advocated by FIAG, 
was adopted by the Scottish Parliament.  This was a three stage process:  
 
Stage 1 – scrutiny of strategic priorities for expenditure; 
Stage 2 - examining of the draft budget; and 
Stage 3 – approval of the expenditure plans in the budget documents. 
 
These three levels of scrutiny were designed to build on the distinctive nature of the 
Scottish Parliament.  The Scottish Parliament is a uni-cameral body, with supporting 
business committees for each of the departments comprising the Scottish Executive 
which cover the spectrum of parliamentary business and which include members of all 
political parties (see Table 2).  These committees fulfill a major function in the Scottish 
Parliament’s discharge of its responsibilities (Lynch, 2001).  They also present the 
possibility of a more deliberate consideration of Parliamentary business in a non-partisan 
setting - a setting which, prima facie, is favourable to the potential of accounting 
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informing the decision-making process.  Within the Scottish Parliament’s budgetary 
scrutiny process, these business committees were charged with scrutiny of strategic 
priorities (Stage 1) and of the draft budget (Stage 2).  The evaluations of these business 
committees on the budget at Stages 1 and 2 are collated by the Finance Committee of the 
Scottish Parliament for a debate in the Parliament itself.  These activities are a prelude to 
Stage 3, the formal evaluation of the budget in the Scottish Parliament. 
 
    Table 2:  Business Committees of the 
        Scottish Parliament 
Health 
Children and Education 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning 
Communities 
Environment 
Transport 
Rural Affairs 
European Funds 
Local Government 
Justice 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 
Source: Scottish Executive, 2001 
 
Furthermore, the specific political context of the Scottish Parliament is distinct from 
Westminster because of the election system: proportional representation rather than the 
“first past the post” election system at the UK Parliament at Westminster.  There have 
been three elections for the Scottish Parliament in 1999, 2003 and 2007.  There was no 
single party with an overall majority at any of these elections.  In 1999 and 2003, the 
Scottish Executive was formed from the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties, a 
coalition government which had a clear majority.  In the May 2007 election, the largest 
single party was the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), with 49 members.  This was not 
sufficient for a majority (of the 130 Members of the Scottish Parliament), but none of the 
other parties were willing to form a coalition government with the SNP and there has 
been a minority government in Scotland since May 2007.  The major focus of this study 
is on the experiences of the first two parliaments which were elected in 1999 and 2003, 
given the relatively short life of the present minority government. 
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(b)Sources of Data 
 
The Scottish Government uses Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) to 
communicate its financial plans and performance to the Scottish Parliament and the 
Scottish people. The Scottish uses this form of accounting as it is considered a part of 
central government by HM Treasury, which has an overarching responsibility for 
financial regulation by central government departments. The impact of new forms of 
accounting in this parliament was investigated in a number of ways as a combined 
methods research strategy, using the unobtrusive measures of documentary records and 
observation (Bryman 2004, p.215), combined with semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 
2004, p.329). 
 
A crucial element of the Rogers diffusion model of innovations is the implementation 
phase (see Stage 5 in Table 1 above). This aspect of innovation is addressed by gathering 
information from the target recipients of this new RAB type information to determine if it 
informs their decision making or whether other sources of information are more 
important to them. A major focus of this paper is on the activities of the Finance 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament.  This committee comprises Members of the 
Scottish Parliament (MSPs) from all major parties represented in the Scottish Parliament.  
This is the major mechanism by which the Scottish Parliament scrutinises, screens and 
analyses public expenditure (planned and actual) of the Scottish Government   
 
As noted above, the Scottish Parliament has adopted a three-stage framework for 
budgetary approval which was recommended by the FIAG (Scottish Office, 1998b).  In 
this framework, Stage 1 is a discussion of the Scottish Government’s budget proposals 
for the year ahead (‘The Annual Expenditure Report’) with provisional plans for a further 
two years.  The main discussion of the Scottish Government’s future strategy and 
priorities at Stage 1 takes place in Subject Committees (see Table 2).  Stage 2 of this 
process entails consideration of firmer spending plans by the Executive, which also 
includes Subject Committee scrutiny.  It is the work of the Finance Committee to form an 
overview and report to Parliament on its deliberations.  At this stage, the FIAG envisaged 
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that the Parliament would have the option of proposing an alternative budget, while the 
total budgeted expenditure remained the same as that of the Scottish Government budget.  
Stage Three, the final part of the process, was seen as the largely formal laying of the 
Scottish Government’s budget before Parliament.   
 
At Stage 1 and Stage 2, the main observation was conducted by a member of this team as 
a participant observer. This researcher was an expert adviser to the Finance Committee. 
This was in financial year 2000-2001.   This gave detailed insights into the scrutiny and 
use of budgetary information and of the RAB innovation.  Observation was also 
conducted by members of the research team who attended Finance Committee meetings. 
This data informed the analysis of the implementation stage of this innovation.  The 
documentary evidence scrutinised included reports by the Finance Committee, by the 
Scottish Executive, internal memoranda and minutes of the Finance Committee. This 
documentary analysis was used across all stages of the diffusion of this innovation. 
 
The interviews were held in the first (1999-2002) and the second (2003-2007) Scottish 
Parliaments.  They were semi-directed with a variety of key actors in or around the 
Scottish Parliament: this included MSPs (from a variety of political parties), Conveners 
of Scottish Parliamentary Committees, the current expert adviser to the Finance 
Committee, clerks and researchers who supported the Parliament’s Finance Committee, 
members of the Scottish Government responsible for the preparation of financial 
information, and Ministers in the Government with a  particular interest in the RAB 
reforms (whether from the perspective of the size of their budgets, or because of 
involvement in the technical implementation of the RAB).  In total, 24 interviews were 
held with key actors. These interviews lasted 60 – 90 minutes and the interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed. The data from these interviews was used in the analysis of 
the implementation stage of this innovation. 
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS: Diffusion Stage 1 – Prior Conditions 
 
The major focus of this study is on the use of RAB information by elected members of 
parliament (and related groups, such as parliamentary advisors and researchers) and 
finance staff who produced government financial reports. As Rogers diffusion model 
indicates (see Table 1, Stage One, Prior Conditions), the receptivity to an innovation can 
be shaped by previous practices, and by felt needs of problems with existing practices. 
There have been earlier research studies of the use of accounting information in the era 
which preceded the implementation of RAB (Likierman and Vass, 1984; Likierman and 
Creasey, 1985), which support a shift to new forms of accounting to promote democratic 
accountability. A major observation from these studies was on the complexity of this 
issue:  
“In any discussion of the expenditure information provided by the 
government, there is at least one aspect on which there is agreement. It is 
difficult. Difficult to compile and difficult to understand. In part, the 
difficulties are due to the size and complexity of the government`s 
financial transactions. In part to the requirements of users, who differ 
greatly in what they want and in their experience and expertise. But there 
are many who have said that difficulties also arise because of the way 
information is presented.” (Likierman and Vass, 1984, p.5) 
 
This study revealed examples of Members of Parliament who observed that few of them 
understand `what is going on` (Likierman and Vass, 1984, p.8) or who claimed that they 
carried `financial documents around in my briefcase unread for months` (Likierman and 
Vass, 1984, p32). It also provided evidence of limited attendance by Members of 
Parliament at debates on financial matters, and government financial documents of that 
era that were viewed as rather dense and impenetrable (Likierman and Creasey 1985). 
 
Accrual accounting in the UK central government (as part of RAB) has been 
implemented since financial year 2001-02.  The details of the precise and distinctive form 
which this took are considered below, but first we briefly examine the process of 
diffusion, the early influences for change within the UK government system.  This 
process has a long trajectory with many voices other than the key player (the HM 
Treasury which determines governmental accounting practice). This is important, as it 
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can be seen that the historical pressures for reform, from a variety of interested parties, 
have influenced the shape and form of the RAB as an innovation. 
 
Before 2001-02, the cash basis of accounting had dominated central government practices 
since the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866.  This is a measure of how radical an 
innovation RAB is.  The 1866 Act introduced a form of Appropriation Accounts which 
showed the resources voted (including supplementary votes, where necessary) to central 
government by parliament.  While this distinctive form of accounting persisted until 
2001, there were a number of attempts to adopt accrual accounting in UK central 
government. These early attempts are precursors of the recognition of the need for this 
innovation. 
 
An early attempt to reform cash-based accounting was proposed by the Select Committee 
on National Expenditure (SCNE, 1918) in which it was critical of the Appropriation 
Accounts on a number of accounts: there was no valuation of assets or liabilities held; 
expenditure should be on actual expenditure and not costs.  This was the first serious 
attempt at the replacement of cash accounting.  It resulted in a pilot study of what was 
called commercial accounting in the Ministry of Defence, but this was never fully 
implemented (see Fletcher, 1989).  The adoption of accrual accounting was confined to 
the naval dockyards (Watkins, 2007).  A subsequent influential report, the Crick Report 
(1950), reviewed UK government accounting and recognised the need for accruals 
accounting, but only for trading activities.  In part, this recommendation was based on 
what were considered to be insuperable practical difficulties in valuing government 
assets. 
 
While these early attempts at reform focussed primarily on accrual accounting, 
subsequently pressures for change extended the nature of proposed reforms beyond 
accounting and financial information.  These pressures can be seen as antecedents of 
RAB. Most importantly, these early deliberations were important elements in shaping 
what RAB would be, and can be seen as a, admittedly somewhat protracted, process of 
working towards what the innovation should be (Geroski, 2000). In 1986, the National 
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Audit Office (NAO) presented a case for the reform of government accounting to the 
Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) at Westminster.  Particular recommendations made 
by the NAO included asset accounting, which it argued would lead to improved 
information on assets which would help in the control and use of resources. In addition, it 
was suggested that the provision of this information would enhance public accountability 
on the deployment, stewardship and control of assets (NAO, 1986, p.3).  The NAO also 
considered that Members of Parliament and other potential users of financial reporting by 
government needed to see clear information on the aims and objectives of activities, as a 
basis for judging efficiency and effectiveness.  These attributes of financial reporting 
were endorsed by the CPA (CPA, 1987), particularly the need for information on both 
assets held and the aims and objectives of public expenditure.  These prior conditions are 
receptive to improving the quality of financial information made available to elected 
members of parliament- a favourable precursor to the development of RAB, with 
performance information and democratic accountability important strands of these 
debates and exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS: Diffusion Stage 2 – Knowledge of the Innovation 
 
The knowledge of a specific innovation has to exhibit sufficient skills and expertise for 
the innovation to be used (see Table 1, Stage 2, Knowledge). However, the debate over 
accrual accounting in central government has primarily been over technical and 
professional issues around the applicability of accrual accounting. For example, the 
introduction of accrual accounting as an accounting innovation in the public sector is 
seen as an essential element (Guthrie et al, 1999; Christensen, 2002; Paulsson, 2006) of 
NPM (Hood, 1991; 1995) reforms. The embedded nature of accrual accounting in the 
early adoption countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, has led to observations on 
the inevitability of the widespread diffusion of this accounting practice as an appropriate 
innovation (Carlin, 2005).  Policy makers, internationally, regard accrual accounting in 
the public sector as a self evident reform, but its adoption has often proved problematic in 
practice (Lapsley, Mussari and Paulsson, 2009). Indeed, critics of the adoption of accrual 
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accounting in the public sector suggest that it has not yielded the benefits proclaimed by 
its proponents (Wynne, 2007; 2008).  
 
The particular focus of this paper is on the introduction of accrual accounting in central 
government. There are proponents of accrual accounting in central government who 
view it as a positive force for improved transparency in public finances (Cangiano, 1996). 
In contrast, there is a suggestion that the advancement of the case for accrual accounting 
by central government has given an opportunity to vested interests – management 
consultants and leading international accounting forms – to gain commercial 
opportunities (Christensen, 2002; Christensen and Parker, 2010). There is also evidence 
from the early adopters of accrual accounting in central governments that this information 
is of use to management in central government accounting departments (Newberry and 
Pallot, 2004; Paulsson, 2006). In a study of accrual accounting in New Zealand central 
government it was found that the use of this information resulted in the erosion of core 
activities within these departments (Newberry and Pallot, 2004). Another early adopter of 
accrual accounting by central government was Sweden. Paulsson`s (2006) study of 
Swedish central government accounting revealed that a primary use of accrual accounting 
information was by government departmental managers. These findings on the use of 
accrual information are consistent with the adoption of forms of accounting from the 
managerial agenda of NPM. 
 
Within the UK, the adoption of accrual accounting has attracted considerable interest. 
There has been research on issues of valuation (Heald and Georgiou, 1995) and on the 
quality and transparency of government financial reports in the new world of accrual 
accounting (Heald, 2005). In an early study, Mellett (2002) challenged the ability of the 
new governmental accounting system to provide meaningful information. An important 
study by Connolly and Hyndman (2006) showed that government accountants 
experienced substantial difficulties in producing the new forms of governmental 
accounting information. This study raises serious questions about the capacity of 
governments to produce meaningful financial reports. Also, a study by Ezzamel et al 
(2005a and 2005b) on the use of accrual accounting within the elected assembly in 
Northern Ireland raised doubts about the appropriateness of accrual information to 
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intended users as part of the new government accounts. However, these findings are 
attenuated by the political context, as that study was undertaken at a time of suspension 
of the elected assembly. 
 
Overall, the knowledge of the possible benefits of accrual accounting was widespread in 
the context of international scholarly debate.  Much of this positioning was fairly 
technical and not informed by evidence based research. While the prior conditions (Stage 
1 –see above) that were favourable to the emergence of an accounting innovation, such as 
RAB, the debate over accrual accounting was narrower with little debate over issues of 
democratic accountability. 
 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS Diffusion Stage 3 - Persuasion 
 
Despite the above debate on the merits or otherwise of accrual accounting, HM Treasury 
chose to adopt this accounting practice for UK central government.  However, while the 
lively scholarly debate did not appear to influence HM Treasury, the evidence presented 
under Stage One, Prior Conditions, did. Furthermore, the process of persuasion had a 
particular managerial, rather than a predominantly democratic accountability, emphasis. 
 
The process by which UK policy documents are open for consultation is three fold: (1) 
the publication of a discussion document (described as a `Green Paper`), (2) the 
articulation of the government`s plans in a policy document (described as a `White 
Paper`) and (3) the approval of an Act of Parliament to authorize the policy. In the 
discussion paper which announced the government’s intention to reform central 
government accounting, the following definitions were set out: 
“Resource accounting is the use of accruals accounting techniques for 
reporting on the expenditure of UK central government, comprising 
departments and their executive agencies including trading funds, and a 
framework for analysing expenditure by departmental objective, relating 
to outputs wherever possible…… resource budgeting is the planning and 
controlling of public expenditure on a resource accounting basis” (HMT 
1994). 
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This form of accounts comprised five schedules: 1. a Summary of Resource Outturn; 2. 
Operating Cost Statement; 3. Balance Sheet; 4. Cash Flow Statement; and 5. Statement of 
Resources (see Annex B, HM Treasury, 1995).  The final of these schedules, the 
Statement of Resources, contains an analysis by aims and objectives. This innovation 
clearly reflected the earlier parliamentary debates and reports on this subject. Therefore, 
the definition of RAB can be seen as an innovation which is the crystallization of 
parliamentary debates over many years. These definitions did not change during the 
period of consultation. 
 
However, the interpretation of what RAB might achieve became a construct in support of 
government managers. This accounting innovation was expected to reduce the need for 
government borrowing by identifying under-utilised assets.  Also, at the level of central 
government, the implementation of RAB was expected to lead to a more systematic 
approach to capital accounting with more meaningful comparisons both across the public 
sector and with the private sector.  It was also anticipated that central government would 
be better informed in planning for expenditure, with a better control of public expenditure 
because of the improved information.  For government departments, those who designed 
the new RAB system of accounting envisaged that departments would have better 
information on the cost of services provided and the resources required to meet their 
objectives.  It was envisaged that RAB would mean that government departments would 
be able to plan internally and be controlled externally on the same basis, with a shift in 
focus to services and outputs rather than inputs.   
 
However, all of these observations have a distinct managerial emphasis consistent with 
an NPM emphasis (Hood, 1991; 1995): the HM Treasury (1994) policy document was 
silent on the implications for the electorate and for elected representatives to UK 
parliaments.  By 2001, the above stated gains of RAB adoption were enhanced by three 
further claimed advantages: (1) better information on how resources are used to meet 
objectives and whether taxpayers are receiving value for money, (2) more and better-
focused information resulting in enhanced accountability to parliament and (3) a 
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contribution to the ‘modernising’ government agenda (HMT, 2001).  This latter agenda 
for RAB is the particular focus of this research, although it is important to note the 
observation that this specific reform was driven in its initial stages by managerialism and 
not by parliamentary accountability.   
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS Diffusion Stage 4 – The Decision 
 
This revolution in accounting practice is also a manifestation of the modernisation agenda 
in government.  RAB was initiated under the pre-1997 Conservative administration.  
However, when the New Labour administration came to power in 1997, it did not reject 
RAB as a product of a prior political regime.  Instead, it saw the potential for systems of 
resource accounting to enhance its key concepts of accountability, of transparency, and, 
in the process, of government becoming more efficient and business-like.  This thinking 
applied to the implementation of RAB across the UK. RAB was not a specific component 
of the devolution agenda and the creation of a Scottish Parliament, although it became 
part of the enactment of devolution, which is the locus of our study of this accounting 
innovation. This was a clear `adoption` decision with no opposition and no thoughts of 
non-implementation or delay. Therefore, while earlier thinking had hinted at a democratic 
accountability dimension to the decision to design, adopt and implement Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting, this was a less important feature of the adoption decision. 
 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS: Diffusion Stage 5 – Implementation 
 
It has been noted above that Rogers observed that the implementation phase of the 
diffusion model had the potential to be problematic (Rogers, 2003, p179-188). A key 
factor in successful implementation is that the innovation is understood and used. We 
noted earlier that studies of elected members of Parliament were not using the financial 
information which they received under the former financial regime (Likierman and Vass, 
1984; Likierman and Creasey, 1985) – see the discussion of Stage 1 (Prior Conditions) of 
the Diffusion of RAB. Therefore to address this most challenging aspect of the diffusion 
model, we have examined a variety of sources of evidence to determine if key actors in 
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and around the Scottish Parliament use and understand financial information prepared on 
a RAB basis. 
 
This part of research findings is analysed in two phases.  In the first phase, we analyse the 
work of the Parliamentary Committees in the Scottish Parliament in their scrutiny of the 
budget setting process. This analysis is based on documentary evidence and observation 
of committees in action. This analysis gives us insights into how parliamentarians use 
financial information. In phase two, we examine the impact of RAB through the lens of 
reflections by key actors in and around the Parliament, based on an analysis of interviews 
with them. 
 
While the adoption of RAB meets the technical definition of a diffusion, in that the 
innovation was adopted (Rogers, 2003), the research results from this paper raise some 
fundamental questions of how meaningful this diffusion was. The process of designing 
RAB did draw on previous government and parliamentary reports. There was a 
consultation process. There were trial runs with old and new accounting systems 
operating in parallel. However, on the face of it, this innovation did not connect with the 
focus of our study – parliamentarians. RAB had started life as an NPM type managerial 
reform. It was latterly re-branded as a useful tool for parliamentarians. The evidence 
which follows reveals a disconnect between RAB and the key actors in this parliament. 
 
 
(a)Phase One : Initial Analysis of  The Use of RAB 
 
(i) Stage One Analysis 
  
This study focuses on the principal budget document (the ‘Annual Expenditure Report’ of 
the Scottish Government) ‘Investing in You’ (IiY) (Scottish Executive, 2000a).  This was 
the first time the Finance Committee and the other Subject Committees of the Scottish 
Parliament had scrutinised such a document as part of the budgetary framework.  The 
Subject Committee reports from the Stage 1 evaluation of IiY document can be grouped 
in two broad categories.  The first group of comments relates to specific policy issues and 
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settings, which exercised the minds of these committees.  For example, the Education 
Committee expressed concern over the funding for an education research facility; the 
Justice and Home Affairs Committee made comments on the prison service and the legal 
aid system for citizens.  However, the second group of comments were more focussed on 
the financial frameworks as a system (see Table 3).  This resulted in a number of 
observations being made. 
 
Table 3:  Subject Committee Comments on  
     Stage 1 Planning Documents 
 
1.  Nature of Information 
 1.1 A need for both cash and real terms data. 
 1.2 Need for evaluations of objectives and targets against performance. 
 
2.  Scrutiny Process 
 2.1 Limited time to scrutinise data. 
 2.2 Omission of latest information. 
   
3.  Lack of Transparency 
 3.1 Inadequate explanations of underspends and end year flexibility. 
 3.2 Inadequate explanations of significant changes to budget. 
 3.3 Efficiency savings are not transparent 
Source: Compiled from Subject Committee responses to Investing in You, Scottish Executive, 2000a. 
 
 There were committees which expressed the need for both cash and real terms data 
(Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; Social Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector; 
Health and Community Care).  Also, there were committees who sought better 
explanations of underspends and ‘end year flexibility’ (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; 
Justice and Home Affairs; Social Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector; Transport and 
the Environment; Health and Community Care), and also better explanations of 
significant changes to budget (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; Justice and Home 
Affairs; Education, Culture and Sport; Transport and the Environment, Health and 
Community Care).  The view was also expressed by committees that efficiency savings 
expected are not transparent (Education, Culture and Sport; Transport and the 
Environment; Health and Community Care).  Also, some Committees commented on the 
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omission of the latest information (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; Education, Culture 
and Sport) and of the limited time available to scrutinise data (Justice and Home Affairs).  
 
 There were also committees concerned with the need for evaluations of objectives and 
targets against performance (Education, Culture and Sport; Transport and the 
Environment). The Equal Opportunities Committee had only one general comment to 
make, which reinforces the above specific comments made by the other committees.  It 
identified the need for a robust and public process of measuring and reporting on 
performance.  As noted above, a key element of any such performance assessment system 
is the quality of objectives and targets.  This issue is taken up, next. 
 
In their discussion of the objectives and targets of the Scottish Government’s Annual 
Expenditure Report (IiY) the Subject Committees focussed on the specific programmes 
for which they were responsible.  There were some positive comments made.  For 
example, the Enterprise and lifelong Learning committee considered that the aims and 
objectives in IiY were consistent with lines of responsibility.  The Transport and 
Environment Committee considered the objectives of its part of the annual expenditure 
report as measurable and meaningful.  However, these were exceptions.  The Equal 
Opportunities Committee described the target for the Equality Unit (to submit its annual 
report by April 2001), as weak and generally expressed the need for more focussed 
results-driven targets.  This criticism is reinforced by the comments of the Justice and 
Home Affairs Committee which stated the objectives within its part of the annual 
expenditure report exhibited a wide range – from the clear and specific to a few vague 
and unhelpful objectives with arbitrary or immeasurable targets.   
 
There was also criticism, not only of the manner of presentation of objectives and targets, 
but also of a lack of information on correct baselines and rate of progress which made it 
difficult to assess how stretching or achievable targets were (the Education, Culture and 
Sport Committee).  This latter Committee also commented on the risk of displacement 
(see Lapsley, 1996) by focussing on quantifiable indicators at the expense of the more 
difficult to define qualitative measures.  The comment made by the Education Committee 
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on the need for realistic baseline information against which targets could be assessed was 
also made by the Committee on Social Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector, by the 
Transport and Environment Committee and by the Health and Community Care 
Committee.   
 
Indeed, the Health and Community Care Committee had most to say of all the 
committees on this matter.  This committee expressed the view that, for health and related 
expenditure, objectives in IiY were focussed on inputs rather than services or outcomes, 
and that aims and objectives were not sufficiently clear and unambiguous, with public 
understanding of the significance of the impact of the specific objectives and targets an 
impossibility.  The Health Committee went further, by stating that the targets for health 
and related expenditure in IiY were limited, partial, input-related, inappropriate to a long-
term perspective, incomplete, unrealistic, unrelated to the budget and confusing on 
responsibility for targets given. 
 
While previous studies of parliamentarians have shown a lack of understanding and 
expertise in the use of public finance planning documents, the above evidence reveals a 
relatively ‘sophisticated’ interrogation of this strategic planning document for this 
parliament.  This particular pattern of ‘relative sophistication’ is within the distinctive 
context of Members of Parliament acting in concert with specialist budget advisers, 
which contrasts with previous studies which have focussed on one-to-one interviews with 
MPs. 
(ii) Stage 2 Analysis 
 
The key document in Stage 2 of the 2000/01 budget cycle was the Scottish Government’s 
budget Making a Difference (Scottish Executive, 2000b).  At the Finance Committee, this 
document was reviewed in the light of comments made by specific subject committees.  
There was a general consensus that the presentation of ‘Making a Difference’ was better 
than ‘Investing In You’.  However, there were numerous observations where Subject 
Committees had difficulties (see Table 4). 
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Table 4:  Subject Committee Comments on 
     Stage 2 Planning Documents 
 
1.  Scrutiny Process 
 1.1 Need for articulation and alignment of the ‘strategy setting’ process and the 
budgeting process. 
 1.2 Continuing concern over the use of the targets. 
 
2.  Lack of Transparency 
 2.1 Need for more detailed information to make sensible comparisons. 
 2.2 Evaluation of the impact of Public-Private Partnership projects not clear. 
 2.3 Need to segregate RAB effect of capital accounting adjustments and cash 
spend. 
 2.4 Not possible to assess cross-cutting policies. 
 2.5 Need for better, more transparent policy-led budgets. 
 2.6 Impossible to relate in-year increases to policy and outcomes. 
 2.7 Headline budget announcements misleading. 
Source: Compiled from Subject Committee responses to Scottish Executive, 2000b, Making a Difference 
 
These committees expressed a general need for articulation and alignment of the 
‘strategy-setting’ process and the budgeting process (Equal Opportunities, Rural Affairs). 
Moreover, it was claimed that the equal opportunities strategy arrived too late for 
comment (Equal Opportunities Committee), Prison Service targets were not published in 
time for budget discussions (Justice and Home Affairs), and the Rural Affairs Minister 
intended to supply information to this Committee after Jan 2001 – too late to inform the 
budget process.  There was also a continuing concern over the use of targets.  
Committees commented that there was a need to specify information in targets and 
outcomes more precisely e.g. against a baseline figure. (Enterprise and Lifelong 
Learning; Health; Transport; Justice and Home Affairs; Social Inclusion).  In addition 
some committees saw a need for Level 3 (i.e. more detailed) information to make 
sensible comparisons (Local Government; Health).  The evaluation of the impact of 
PFI/PPP projects on budgets was not clear, and required clarification (Transport; Health).  
Furthermore, the introduction of RAB distorted comparisons between ‘Making a 
Difference’ and ‘Investing In You’.  There was a need for more explanation in the view of 
a number of committees (Health, Social Inclusion; Transport).   Indeed, some committees 
saw a need to segregate the RAB effect of capital accounting adjustments and cash spend 
(Health; Social Inclusion).  It was also difficult for committees to relate expenditure plans 
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to policies.  For example, one committee observed that it could not assess ‘cross-cutting’ 
policies from ‘Making a Difference’ (Rural Affairs) and identified a need for a better, 
more transparent operation of policy-led budgets (e.g. spend on health promotion, social 
inclusion, national framework on health policy).   
 
These difficulties were further complicated by the impact of the increases in budgets as a 
result of Whitehall’s Comprehensive Spending Review on the document ‘Making a 
Difference’. These welcome additional funds created problems because it was not 
possible to relate the additional funds to policy and outcomes, and the use of headline 
announcements had the effect of a double/triple accounting (for example, the difference 
in expenditure between Years 1 and 3 may be announced, but this may ignore 
expenditure in Year 2 and just focus on the difference between Year 1 and Year 3). This 
is exacerbated both by MSPs who are used to thinking in terms of ‘annuality’ and by the 
new government policy of switching to three year budgets.  Finally, the local government 
committee challenged the process of budgeting, particularly the use of the efficiency 
assumption.  It favoured attacking efficiency through the audit process. 
 
(iii) Stage 3 Deliberations 
 
The outcome of the Stage 1 and Stage 2 deliberations by the Subject Committees of the 
Scottish Parliament and by the Finance Committee of the Scottish Parliament was Stage 
3:  a budget report was laid before Parliament (Scottish Parliament, 2000).  This endorsed 
the budget proposed by the Scottish Executive.  It also expressed concern about the 
difficulties of making sense of RAB-type information, given its novelty, and over the 
difficulties of disentangling the affects of in-year budgeting adjustments arising from the 
Comprehensive Spending Review by the Treasury.  This report also welcomed the 
‘Making a Difference’ document as a significant improvement on ‘Investing in You’.  
However, many of very specific points which were made by Subject Committees do not 
feature in this report.  Also, only marginal changes to planned expenditure were made as 
a result of this scrutiny and the right to recast the budget was not exercised by the 
parliament. 
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Overall, this analysis of the use of RAB at the Scottish Parliament reveals significant 
difficulties.  In particular, there are major concerns over the lack of transparency in the 
parliament’s budgeting arrangements. There are major problems over the 
operationalisation of strategic priorities in a way which can be detected in financial plans.  
Concerns over a proliferation of targets and difficulties in relating overarching policies to 
difficulties of the budgetary scrutiny system in the first parliament (1999-2002) were 
repeated in the second parliament (2003-2007) as the budget adviser to the second 
Scottish Parliament has demonstrated (Midwinter, 2005). However, this analysis also 
reveals that parliamentarians have particular interests in information on activities (scope, 
volume) and whether they achieve their objectives or targets. This manner of thinking is 
consistent with the ideas behind RAB, as elaborated upon in parliamentary committees in 
the debates which were the antecedents of the RAB innovation (see section 4 above). 
 
 
(b)Phase Two : An  Analysis of Reflections on  The Use of RAB 
 
 
This study examined the RAB innovation in the first and second Parliaments, by talking 
to key actors (providers of accounting information within the Scottish Government; 
auditors of the accounting information supplied to the Scottish parliament; advisers (as 
expert adviser, clerks and researchers) to Members of the Scottish Parliament and 
Members of the Scottish Parliament and Ministers within the Scottish Executive).  This 
revealed that providers of RAB documents are sceptical about the capability of MSPs to 
interrogate such information.  For example, the following quote from a senior civil 
servant expresses the frustration of the providers of this information: 
 
"There is a very large volume of information.  We seem to be in a position 
where we have to produce printed publications every time we want to 
provide information.  We do seem to be tied in too much to producing 
loads of printed publications which very few people look at.” 
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This civil servant proceeded to challenge the capabilities of parliamentarians: 
 
 
“ The other difficulty we have is, I think, the capacity of Parliament and 
the committees to use the information is really very limited.  They are 
demanding more, but we don't really see them making much use of it.  But 
I think that is more an issue of their capacity to use it rather than it's us not 
producing enough.”   
 
 
Although this civil servant did concede that there may be an element of 
culpability attached to his colleagues as those who design and produce financial 
documents for parliament: 
 
“The continuing question mark is whether we are producing it in the most 
useful format.  We are continuing to struggle with that. The bit of it that I 
find a bit hard is that the accounts which we now produce compared to 
previously are extremely informative and there are all sorts of things in 
them, and as far as I can tell, nobody looks at them.” 
 
The Convenor of  a Parliamentary Committee observed that she and her committee 
members had got some improvements made, but observed that there is `still a long way to 
go`. This Convenor observed that ‘the accounting information at the top level is very 
good, but it is more difficult to get relevant information when you drill down for more 
detailed figures’. Another senior politician concurred with the view that accounting 
information had improved a lot, but still found it difficult to track expenditure in the 
financial documents. Indeed, expert advisers to Members of the Scottish Parliament 
express the view that only a minority of MSPs can challenge the financial information in 
a meaningful way. 
 
Furthermore, many MSPs have faced ‘information overload’ from electronic mail, 
documents and reports of the Scottish Parliament, information from pressure groups) and 
the RAB-type information can get lost in this, as the quote from a Clerk to the Finance 
Committee illustrates: 
“.. at the moment (the Government) is producing about twelve different 
documents over the year.  Some of them are the size of a telephone 
directory.  It is very difficult to know what to do with it.  And the 
Parliament has been overwhelmed by financial information.” 
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Stage 3 of the budgetary process - the laying of the budget of the Scottish Executive 
before the Scottish Parliament has become entirely formal with limited or no debate.  One 
former Finance Minister reflected on the budgetary process, as follows: 
“It is very, very difficult for backbenchers and MSPs to really engage in a 
big way in the budget process.  And I am not sure how they can do that.  
This is one example where I am pretty sure that the kind of massive 
numbers that backbenchers, MSPs, committee members get, must be just 
an enormous burden to try to work through.  I think if you asked 
backbenchers and MSPs they would probably still feel a bit dissatisfied 
with the level of influence they have on the budgeting process.  I don't 
think that there is any malice in that.  I think the negotiation of the budget 
is just a nightmarish process as it involves the Parliament and the 
Ministers, so I suppose they probably feel that they only really check that 
there is nothing fraudulent, and also maybe influence a bit at the margins.  
And that is probably fair.  I think this is partly to do with the volume of 
the information and the complexity of it.” 
 
Most of the scrutiny of the Scottish Government`s spending proposals takes place within 
the Subject Committees, but they have experienced frustration, and their impact in terms 
of changing the budget has been slight. The Finance Committee is the key repository of 
expertise in challenging the Scottish Government spending proposals, but it has never 
exercised its right to recast the Scottish Government’s budget proposals.  Most MSPs 
interviewed expressed a reluctance to comment on specific accounting mechanisms such 
as RAB, with many unable to define it or explain what its intended effects were. 
 
However, there is a strong view across members of the Finance Committee that targets, 
objectives and outcomes are crucial elements of modern financial reporting.  This can be 
seen from the repeated references to more precise information not just on objectives and 
targets, but on outcomes and the relationship of these three elements of financial 
planning. One MSP insisted that he was in parliament because of his concern with the 
quality of public services and how this affected his constituents. This is a perspective 
which is much more about public service outcomes than statements of financial inputs. 
This raises fundamental questions about the relationship of levels of funding in particular 
services with the quality of that service provision. 
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This intuitive feel for what counts in the minds of politicians was expressed in the 
following terms by a researcher with the parliament, who advised members on economic 
and financial matters: 
“There are members of the parliament who are interested in financial 
issues.  They range across all the parties.  In fairness, most members are 
bored by this.  But they are more interested in the processes underneath 
what the organisation actually achieves.  They are more interested in the 
outputs and outcomes rather than the inputs.”   
 
In this sense, the MSPs are very knowledgeable on the intentions of RAB, if limited in 
their knowledge of its technical construction. This raises questions over the capacity of 
finance specialists to deliver the kind of information which parliamentarians need to 
discharge their democratic responsibilities. In this sense, the RAB innovation can be seen 
as managerial in intent and execution, with the needs of parliamentarians sidelined. This 
outcome is exacerbated by the decrying of parliamentarians as having `limited capacity` 
to understand accounting information, when they actually have a very clear idea of the 
kinds of information which they need. 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS Diffusion Stage 6 – Confirmation 
 
The UK government continues to use RAB. It has become routine (Rogers, 2003, p.180) 
By this measure it can be argued that there is confirmation of the success of this 
innovation.  However, it has been shown above that the apparent benefits of this system 
are contested, in particular by parliamentarians. Although it is evident that members of 
HM Treasury are content to act as advocates for this system, despite these apparent 
failings (Watkins, 2007). 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
This study has used the diffusion model of Rogers (1995; 2003) to examine the 
introduction of an accounting innovation – RAB. This model has six stages. The 
discussion of each of these six stages in the diffusion of RAB is complex and their 
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examination is necessarily complicated. However, an overview is offered here (see Table 
5) which reveals the extent to which the diffusion model offers explanatory power. 
 
Table 5: An Overview of the Diffusion of RAB 
 Attribute Comment 
1.Prior Conditions There was disquiet over the efficacy of 
previous systems of central government 
accounting and specific recommendations 
for reform consistent with RAB. 
2.Knowledge The adoption of accrual accounting by 
central governments became an important 
feature of NPM reforms. This debate did 
not touch on democratic accountability 
3.Persuasion In the UK there is a very distinct process of 
consultation which was followed in this 
case. However, the strength of the 
government convictions did not allow for 
significant change to its proposals. At this 
point considerations of democratic 
accountability emerged as part of 
government thinking. 
4.Decision The decision to adopt RAB was a political 
decision as part of an attempt to position 
the government as modern. 
5.Implementation The present system of RAB is too complex 
for parliamentarians who struggle to make 
effective use of it. But parliamentarians 
have clear ideas of what they do want. 
6.Confirmation RAB continues in use. It has become 
routine. It has advocates within HM 
Treasury.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
                
This paper investigated a major accounting innovation - the reform of UK central 
government accounting - which entailed the implementation of accrual accounting in 
central government.  The specific form of accrual accounting studied was Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) – the UK version of accrual accounting for central 
government.  This model of accrual accounting entails the conventional approach of 
including asset valuations and depreciation, but it also includes distinctive features, 
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notably the inclusion of statements which analyse aims and objectives against resource 
use.  This distinctive form of accrual accounting was investigated in the Scottish 
Parliament, which was created as part of the UK government’s modernisation policy of 
devolution of powers – specifically to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. As part of 
this modernisation, the executives and elected bodies of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland continued to be regarded as part of central government for accounting parties and 
have all been required to implement Resource Accounting and Budgeting. 
 
This study examined the implementation of RAB in Scotland over the six stages of 
Rogers diffusion model (see table 1) from the perspective of democratic accountability.  
The implementation stage of these phenomena was of particular interest. This tested 
whether the innovation of RAB worked or not. This was investigated in two phases: first, 
there was scrutiny of budgetary documents and observation; second, there was further 
scrutiny of RAB, from the perspective of actual and potential users of this information.  
Regarding the first part of this study, the focus was on documents in the public domain.  
However, this study had access to detailed scrutiny of these budgetary documents, which 
is not in the public domain.  This particular approach is distinctive, with interesting 
results.  It reveals how Members of the Scottish Parliament scrutinised these financial 
documents as part of the activities of business committees of the Scottish Parliament with 
key responsibilities for the discharge of budget scrutiny. 
 
Studies of RAB’s predecessor, a cash-based system, suggests that Members of the UK’s 
Westminster Parliament were disconnected from the financial scrutiny process, that they 
were ill at ease with the financial and planning documents, and that they made little use 
of them.  There is less direct evidence available on the new RAB system, other than 
studies of the elected assembly in Northern Ireland (Ezammel et al, 2005a; 2005b).  
While the Northern Ireland results are interesting – they point to two classes of political 
users (insiders and outsiders) – they are limited by the fact that, for most of the period 
studied, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended because of political conflict. 
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The findings of the present study corroborate, but also contradict, these earlier studies.  
There is evidence that Members of the Scottish Parliament are not confident in the 
handling of RAB-type information.  However, in part this is a reflection of the sheer 
volume of information to which these Members of Parliament are exposed – information 
overload.  While the formal laying of the budget before parliament is a purely formal 
exercise – almost a legitimating ritual – there are interesting findings around the earlier 
stages of the budget process which contrast with this legitimating perspective.   In 
particular, while the experiences of the Subject Committees in the scrutiny were 
frustrating, this was mainly because of the inability of committees to influence the 
budget.  This actual circumstance reflects the incremental nature of budget setting in the 
public sector, in which all of the focus is on the size of the increment or ‘growth’ monies 
and the prioritisation of these resources.  However, the concept of RAB is not just to 
implement accrual accounting; there is also the distinctive information on aims and 
objectives for services.  This study’s examination of the processes of scrutiny of planning 
documents revealed interesting responses.  While acting in concert, these MSPs displayed 
a high level of understanding of what RAB was seeking to achieve.  They exhibited 
major concerns with the setting of targets, their relationship to policies and wider 
objectives and resources devoted to thematic priorities.  This corroborates the findings of 
interviews with individual Members of Parliament. 
 
As noted above, the theoretical lens used in this study is the idea of the diffusion of 
innovations. This framework is most closely associated with the work of Rogers (1983; 
1995; 2003). The Rogers’ model has attracted criticism, but has been defended as a 
widely used model with longevity (Rogers, 2004). This model and those derived from it, 
have been criticised on its `pro-individual` and `pro-innovation` bias (Abrahamson 
(1991) and Greenhalgh et al, 2005). This criticism holds true for RAB and the specific 
context studied in this paper, in which the complexity of the study setting and the 
presumption of the suitability of RAB are evident. It has also been suggested that the 
wider social context, including historical, political and ideological reasons for 
innovations are not considered in the Rogers’ model (Chua, 1995; Briers and Chua, 2002; 
Greenhalgh et al.,2005) and these merit consideration in studies of diffusion. This 
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perspective has been deployed in this paper, to good effect. Also, the compulsory, 
coercive aspect of innovations, especially accounting ones, in the public sector is another 
important strand of public sector innovation (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley and 
Wright, 2004) and this has been shown to be the case in this study. 
 
One particular outcome of this study is the nature of RAB type information and whether 
this promoted transparency in public finances. While transparency is a major objective of 
the Scottish Parliament’s public finances, there are a number of aspects of these findings 
which suggest that there is scope for refining what transparency is and might become.  In 
the first instance, the mere release of additional information (in this case, accrual 
information) is not sufficient to convey transparency.  Second, the capacity to interrogate 
these publicly available financial documents should not be restricted to considering 
experts (whether described as ‘gatekeepers’ or insiders), but also to actions of Members 
of Parliament, in concert.  Third, the analysis of evidence which is not in the public 
domain, the comments of Subject Committees of the Parliament on budget documents 
over the planning cycle, reveal that this group of potential users is most confident in 
handling the wider RAB-type information on targets and objectives.  Fourth, the idea of 
transparency is context-specific.  The particular characteristics of these budgetary 
documents created a demand on the part of these parliamentarians for more refined 
information which related strategies to baseline and incremental (growth) expenditure.  
These observations underline the need to shift from a uni-dimensional concept of 
transparency to a more complex elaboration of what transparency means. 
 
Finally, the RAB system implemented in the UK is a radical innovation, i.e. a dramatic 
departure from practices which persisted from the mid-19th century.  It is also distinctive 
and novel in its content.  While the RAB innovation was the outcome of lengthy 
deliberations and consultation, there is evidence in this paper, particularly from 
government policy documents, which suggest that a major motive for this innovation was 
managerial.  We do not wish to overstate the strength of this evidence. However, any 
privileging of the managerial interest group may have attenuated the position of 
parliamentarians. The literature suggests elected members of parliament have limited 
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financial expertise. This study suggested the RAB innovation was flawed with respect to 
parliamentarians, because, while, on the face of it, this form of accounting went beyond 
narrow financials, it failed to represent the parliamentarians` interest in issues of activity, 
outcomes and of quality of service within its financial framework in a manner in which 
they could utilise this information effectively. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abrahamson, E., (1991) Managerial fads and fashions: the diffusion and rejection of 
innovations, Academy of Management Review Vol. 16, No.3,July pp 586-612 
Bogdanor, V. (2001), Devolution in the United Kingdom,, Oxford University Press. 
Bjornenak , T. ( 1997) Diffusion and Accounting: The Case of ABC in Norway, 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 8, No.2, pp3-17 
Bjornenak, T  and O. Olson (1999) Unbundling Management Accounting Innovations, 
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 10, pp325-338 
Briers, M. and W.F.Chua (2002) The role of actor-networks and boundary objects in 
management accounting change: a  field study of an implementation of activity 
based costing, Accounting Organizations and Society, Vol.26, pp237-269 
Bryman, A. (2004) Social Research Methods (2nd edition), Oxford University Press. 
Cangiano, M. (1996) “Accountability and Transparency in the Public Sector: The New 
Zealand Experience”, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/96/122, 
November. 
Carlin, T., (2005) Debating the impact of accrual accounting in the public sector, 
Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 21 (3) , pp309-336 
Christensen, M., (2002) Accrual Accounting in the public sector: the case of the New 
South Wales government, Accounting History, November 2002, Vol.7 No.2, 
pp93-124 
Christensen, M., and L. Parker (2010) Using Ideas to Advance Professions: Public Sector 
Accrual Accounting, Financial Accountability & Management, Vol.26 (3) pp246-
266 
Chua, W.F.  (1995) Experts, networks and inscriptions in the fabrication of accounting 
images: a story of the representation of three public hospitals, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol.20, pp111-145 
Clegg , S.R.,  Hardy , C., Nord, W.R. (1996) Handbook of Organization Studies, Sage. 
Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) (1987) Financial Reporting to Parliament, Eighth 
Report, House of Commons, Session 1986-87, HMSO. 
Connolly, C. and N. Hyndman (2006) The actual implementation of accruals accounting. 
Caveats from a case within the UK public sector, Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, Vol.19, No 2, pp272-290 
Crick Report (1950) Report on Governmental Accounting cited in C. Fletcher (1989) 
Governmental Accounting, (ICAS). Edinburgh. 
 35 
Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, A. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2005a) “Conflict and 
Rationality: Accounting in Northern Ireland’s Devolved Assembly, Financial 
Accountability & Management, Vol.21, No.1, pp.33-56. 
Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, A. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2005b) “Accounting, 
Accountability and Devolution: A Study of the Use of Accounting Information by 
Politicians in the Northern Ireland Assembly’s First Term”, Irish Accounting 
Review, Vol.12, No.1, pp.39-62. 
Fletcher, C. (1989) Government Accounting, Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS), Edinburgh. 
Geroski, P.A., (2000) Models of  technology diffusion, Research Policy, Vol. 29, pp603-
625 
Greenhalgh, T., G.Robert, P. Bate, O. Kyriakidou, F. Macfarlane and R. Peacock (2005) 
Diffusion of Innovations in Health Service Organisations: A SystematicLiterature 
Review, Basil Blackwell. 
Guthrie, J., O. Olsen and C. Humphrey (1999) “Debating Developments in New Public 
Financial Management: The Limits of Global Theorising and Some New Ways 
Forward”, Financial Accountability & Management, Vol.15, Nos. 3 and 4, 
pp.209-228. 
Heald, D. and G.Georgiou (1995) Resource Accounting: Valuation, Consolidation and 
Accounting Regulation, Public Administration, Vol. 73, pp371-379 
Heald, D. (2005) The Implementation of Resource Accounting in UK Government, 
Financial Accountability & Management, Vol.21 (2) pp 163-190 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) (1994) Better Accounting for the Taxpayer’s Money: The 
Government’s Proposals, CM2626, HMSO. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) (1995) Better Accounting for the Taxpayer’s Money, The 
Government’s Proposals, Resource Accounting and Budgeting in Government 
(CM2929), July, HMSO. 
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) (2001) Managing Resources: Full Implementation of 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting, London, April. 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, Vol. 69, 
No. 1, pp. 3-19. 
Hood, C. (1995). The New Public Management in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2/3, pp. 93-109. 
Jackson, A., and I. Lapsley (2003) The diffusion of accounting practices in the new 
`managerial `public sector, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 
Vol. 16 (5), pp359-372 
Johannessen, A., B. Olsen, and G. T. Lumpkin  (2001) Innovation as newness: what is    
new, how new, and new to whom? European Journal of Innovation Management, 
pp21-31 
Lapsley, I. (1996), ‘Reflections on Performance Measurement in the Public Sector’, in I. 
Lapsley and F, Mitchell (eds) Accounting and Performance Management: Issues 
in the Private and Public Sectors, Paul Chapman, London. 
Lapsley, I., R. Mussari and G. Paulsson (2009) On the Adoption of Accrual Accounting   
in the Public Sector: A Self-evident and Problematic Reform, European 
Accounting Review, Vol.18 (4) pp719-723 
 36 
Lapsley, I. and H. Wright (2004) The diffusion of management accounting innovations in 
the public sector: A research agenda, Management Accounting Research, Vol.15 
pp355-374 
Likierman, A. and P. Vass (1984) Government Expenditure Statements: Proposals for 
Reform, Association of Certified Accountants. 
Likierman, A. and P. Creasey (1985) Public Expenditure Documents Presented to 
Parliament: Evaluation of Changes in Form and Structure, 1984-85, Certified 
Research Report 4, Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, London. 
Likierman, A. (2000), ‘Changes to Managerial Decision-taking in UK Central Government’,    
Management Accounting Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 253-261.  
Lynch, Peter (2001). Scottish Government and Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.  
Malmi, T. (1999) Activity –based costing diffusion across organisations: an exploratory 
empirical analysis of Finnish firms, Accounting Organizations and Society, 
Vol.24 (8) pp649-672 
Mellett, H. (2002) The Consequences and Causes of Resource Accounting, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 13 (2), pp231-254 
Midwinter, A. (2005) “Budgetary Scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament: An Advisor’s 
View”, Financial Accountability & Management, Vol.21, No.1, pp.13-32. 
National Audit Office (NAO) (1986) Financial Reporting to Parliament, Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, July 1986, HMSO. 
Newberry, S.and J. Pallot (2004), Freedom or Coercion? NPM Incentives in New 
Zealand central government departments, Management Accounting Research, 
Vol.15(3) pp 247-266 
Paulsson, G., (2006) Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector: Experiences From the 
Central Government of Sweden, Financial Accountability & Management , Vol. 
22 (1), pp 47-62 
Rogers, E., (1983) Diffusion of Innovations 3rd edition, The Free Press 
Rogers, E., (1995) Diffusion of Innovations 4th edition, The Free Press 
Rogers, E., (2003) Diffusion of Innovations 5th edition, The Free Press 
Rogers, E., (2004) A Prospective and Retrospective Look at the Diffusion Model, 
Journal of Health Communication, Vol.9, Supplement 1, pp13-19 
Scottish Executive, (2000a) Investing In You: The Annual Expenditure Report of the 
Scottish Executive, Stationery Office, Edinburgh. 
Scottish Executive, (2000b) Making A Difference for Scotland: Spending Plans for 
Scotland 2001-02 to 2003-04, Stationery Office, Edinburgh. 
Scottish Office, (1998a), Report on the Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish 
Parliament, Stationery Office, Edinburgh. 
Scottish Office (1998b), Report on the Financial Issues Advisory Group, Stationery 
Office, Edinburgh.  
Scottish Parliament (2000), Finance Committee 16th Report 2000, Session 1 (2000) SP 
Paper 236, Stationery Office, Edinburgh. 
Scottish Parliament (2001), Finance Committee 7th Report 2001, Resource Accounting 
and Budgeting, Session 1, SP Paper 357, Edinburgh. 
Select Committee on National Expenditure (1918), Report on Reform of Government 
Accounting, cited in C. Fletcher (1989), Government Accounting, (ICAS), 
Edinburgh. 
 37 
Swan, J.A., and  S. Newell (1995) The role of professional associations in technology 
diffusion, Organisation Studies  Vol.16 (5), pp847-874 
Van de Ven, A.A.,(1986) Central problems in the management of innovation, 
Management Science  Vol.32, No.5, pp590-607 
Watkins, D. (2007) “Evolution of Accrual Accounting in the UK Central Government”, 
Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Ammistrazione, Rome, 26th September. 
Wynne, A.,(2007) Is the move to accrual based accounting a real priority for public 
sector accounting? Public Fund Digest, Vol.VI, No.1 
Wynne, A., (2008)  Accrual Accounting for the public sector – A fad that has had its day? 
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management, pp117-132 
 
